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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS-European Convention for the Pre-
vention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, Eur. T.S. No. 126, reprinted
in 27 I.L.M. 1152 (1988) (entered into force Feb. 1, 1989)
The Council of Europe broke new ground in the field of human rights
on November 26, 1987 when it opened the European Convention for
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Convention) for signature. The Convention is the first
human rights accord that sets up procedures for the prevention of
torture and other ill-treatment of individuals. Although it represents
a challenging development in the international fight against torture,
loopholes in the document and the inherent difficulty of enforcing
international human rights norms suggest that the Convention will
engender more hope than progress.
The Convention' is the latest progeny of the recent international
effort to combat torture that dates back to the 1948 Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration). 2 The strong stand
against torture taken by the Universal Declaration has been reinforced
by several subsequent international agreements. 3 The succession of
torture prohibitions in these international accords gave Amnesty In-
ternational support for its 1973 claim that "[ilt can safely be stated
1. European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, Eur. T.S. No. 126, reprinted in 27 I.L.M.
1152 (1988) [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention entered into force on Feb. 1, 1989.
2. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/811, at 2 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. The Universal Declaration built on article
55 of the United Nations Charter, which obligates the member states to "universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Although the Universal Declaration
is an aspirational document rather than a binding treaty, see Universal Declaration, supra,
preamble, its influence in human rights law and the fight against torture has been significant.
See N. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art.
II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (1948) (prohibiting "serious bodily or mental harm to members of
[a national, ethnic, racial or religious] group"); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, art. XXVI, res. XXX, reprinted in 43 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 133, 137 (1949)
(prohibiting "cruel, infamous or unusual punishment"); Geneva Conventions on the protection
of war victims, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 1, 32, 88, 136-38, 288-90 (1950)
(banning "at any time and in any place whatsoever. . . violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture"); Supplementary Convention on
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, art.
5, 4 U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 24/20 (1956); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106, art. 5, para. 2, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
14) at 47, 48, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 7, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 53, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5, reprinted
in 9 I.L.M. 673, 676 (1970).
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. . . that under all circumstances, regardless of the context in which
it is used, torture is outlawed under the common law of man-
kind. ' 4 Western European states took a leading role in promoting
the values embodied in the Universal Declaration by adopting in 1950
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention). 5 Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion declares that "[nJo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."6 The prohibition against
torture in the European Convention is absolute; it may not be violated
even in times of war or national crisis.7
The enforcement procedure for the rights in the European Conven-
tion involves three bodies: the European Commission of Human Rights
(Commission), the European Court of Human Rights (Court), and the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (Committee of
Ministers)." The European Convention empowers the Commission to
receive petitions on alleged violations either from other state parties9
4. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE 38 (1975). The United Nations Special
Rapporteur on torture views the prohibition against torture as jus cogens, or a peremptory norm
of general international law. Report by the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15,
at 1 (1986); see also A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 314 (1986);
N.RODLEY, supra note 2, at 70. In the United States, the Second Circuit has termed the torturer
"an enemy of all mankind" and torture a crime against humanity. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
5. Opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 thereinafter European Convention].
The European Convention has been ratified by all 21 members of the Council of Europe: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 1954 UNTIL 1984 1
(1984) [hereinafter STOCK-TAKING: 1954-1984].
6. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, at 224. The European Convention does not
define torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The European Commission
of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have, however, developed definitions
for the critical concepts in article 3. For extended discussions of these concepts, see Doswald-
Beck, What Does the Prohibition of "Torture or Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" Mean?
The Interpretation of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, 25 NETH. INT'L. L. REV.
24 (1978), and N. RODLEY, supra note 2, at 71-95.
7. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, at 224. Article 15 allows signatory states to
derogate from the duties imposed by the treaty "[i]n time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation." Id., art. 15, at 232. Member states, however, shall not
derogate from article 2 (protection of life), except for death caused by lawful acts of war; article
3 (torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment); article 4, para. 1 (slavery or
servitude); and article 7 (retroactive punishment). Id., arts. 2, 3, 4 and 7, at 224-32. On the
absolute nature of the prohibition, see Duff-y, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
32 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 316, 321-22 (1983). For a philosophical reflection on torture, see
Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 124 (1978).
8. Article 19 created both the Commission and the Court. European Convention, supra note
5, art. 19, at 234.
9. Id., art. 24, at 236. All but one of the state petitions submitted to the Commission have
includ-d allegations of violations of article 3. See Greece v. United Kingdom, 2 Y.B. EUR.
CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 174 (1958); The Greek Case, 13 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 108
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or from individuals, groups of individuals, or non-gbvernmental or-
ganizations, provided the state party complained against has recog-
nized the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions. 1
The Commission decides whether to admit a petition. " If the petition
is admitted, the Commission investigates the complaint and seeks a
friendly settlement. 12 If no settlement is reached, the Commission
sends the Committee of Ministers a report on the facts with an opinion
as to whether the European Convention has been violated. 13 If the
states involved in the complaint have recognized the jurisdiction of
the European Court of Human Rights, the Commission or the states
may request the Committee of Ministers to refer the case to the Court
for decision. 14 The rulings of the Court are binding on the states
involved, 15 and the Committee of Ministers supervises the execution
of the judgment.16 If the case is not brought before the Court, the
Committee of Ministers decides whether the European Convention has
been violated, and its decision is bifiding. 17
Even though the European Convention's procedures have influenced
other human rights efforts, 18 two factors combined in the late 1960's
and early 1970's to stimulate efforts by European human rights ad-
(1970) (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands submitted charges against Greece);
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 15 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HuM RTs. 76 (1972); Cyprus v. Turkey,
18 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. 82 (1975); The Turkish Case, 26 Y.B. EuR. CONY, ON
Hum. RTs. part II, ch. I., at 1 (1983) (Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden in 1982 submitting charges against Turkey). For an overview of the above cases, see
STOCK-TAKING: 1954-1984, supra note 5, at 7-19 (1984).
10. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 25, at 238. As of Dec. 31, 1986, 18 states had
recognized the competence of the Commission to receive individual petitions: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechten-
stein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STOCK-TAKING ON THE EU-
ROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: SUPPLEMENT 1986 v (1988) [hereinafter STOCK-
TAKING: SUPPLEMENT). The Commission has received many individual complaints alleging
violations of article 3, most of which were declared inadmissible. The extensive Commission
and Court case law on article 3 is summarized in Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, passim, and Duffy,
supra note 7, passim.
11. European Convention, supra note 5, arts. 26-27, at 238.
12. Id., art. 28, at 238-40.
13. Id., art. 31, at 240.
14. Id., art. 48, at 246. The Court achieved its competence to hear cases on Sept. 3, 1958.
Id., art. 56, at 248. As of Dec. 31, 1986, 19 states had recognized the competence of the
Court to hear cases: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, STOCK-TAKING: SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 10, at v.
15. European Convention, supra note 5, arts. 52-53, at 248.
16. Id., art. 54, at 248.
17. Id., art. 32, at 240-44.
18. The European Convention's structure and practice influenced the drafting and adoption
of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, and the 1969
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 3.
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vocates to improve the European Convention's machinery to fight
torture and other ill-treatment. First, Europeans became disillusioned
with the European Convention's ability to deal effectively with torture.
For example, although Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Nether-
lands filed petitions against Greece alleging torture, the European
Convention's procedures were ineffective in stopping or preventing
torture in Greece. 19 Amnesty International commented that the Greek
torturers' "appreciation of the international system and the effective-
ness of the international protection of human rights was certainly more
accurate than the hopes of the intellectuals and professors they were
torturing. "20 Even where the European Convention's machinery had
an opportunity to function, the process took years. In the Ireland v.
United Kingdom case, 21 six years passed from the lodging of the com-
plaint to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights-a pace
grossly inadequate for the immediate needs of fighting torture and
other ill-treatment. 22
Second, the efforts of Amnesty International in the early 1970's
jolted the complacent international attitude toward torture. In its
1975 Report on Torture, Amnesty International reported that over sixty
countries practiced torture. 23
European states began to push within the United Nations and the
Council of Europe for new measures to protect individuals from tor-
ture.2" In the mid-1970's, Jean-Jacques Gautier, a Swiss human rights
19. The Greek Case, supra note 9.
20. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 100.
21. 15 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON Hums. RTs. 76 (1972). Ireland filed a complaint against the
United Kingdom in 1971 and two supplementary memorials in 1972 in response to British
detention and interrogation policies towards suspected Irish Republican Army terrorists. After
the European Commission made its report to the Committee of Ministers, Ireland referred the
case to the European Court of Human Rights. The Court ruled that the British techniques used
in 1971 violated article 3. Id. For more on this case, see O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers
Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 71 Am. J. INT'L.
L. 674 (1977).
22. As one commentator has stated: "Although it takes an average of about six years for a
case to be decided in Strasbourg, in some instances nine or ten years have elapsed before a case
is resolved." Drzemczewski, The European Human Rights Convention: Timefor a Radical Overhaul?,
10 B.C. INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 9, 13 (1987).
23. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 31. Amnesty International summed up the
painful paradox: "Never has there been a stronger or more universal consensus on the total
inadmissability [sic] of the practice of torture . . . [but] at the same time the practice of torture
has reached epidemic proportions." Id.
24. The effort within the United Nations led to a series of General Assembly resolutions
concerning torture that reaffirmed the prohibition against torture but did not improve interna-
tional protection or remedies. The pertinent resolutions are: G.A. Res. 3059, 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30) at 74, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 3218, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 31) at 82, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34)
at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); G.A. Res. 3453, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 92,
U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); G.A. Res. 32/62, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 137, U.N.
Doc. A/32/45 (1977); G.A. Res. 32/63, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 137, U.N. Doc.
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lawyer, began promoting the idea of a new European convention for
the prevention of torture. 25 Gautier wanted to incorporate the system
of periodic visits and confidential recommendations to government
authorities developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross
in its work with prisoners of war under the four Geneva Conventions. 26
A draft prevention treaty followed. Through a confidential visitation
system to detention facilities by an independent European body, Gau-
tier and other European human rights activists hoped to prevent acts
of torture and ill-treatment instead of merely reacting to them through
the petition procedures of the European Convention. 27
In deference to the United Nations' efforts to prepare a United
Nations Convention against Torture, the International Commission of
Jurists and the Swiss Committee against Torture28 turned Gautier's
draft prevention treaty into a draft Optional Protocol to the proposed
United Nations Convention against Torture. 29 In 1980, Costa Rica
submitted this draft Optional Protocol to the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights for consideration. Although the Council of
Europe threw its support behind the draft Optional Protocol, 30 the
A/32/45 (1977); G.A. Res. 32/64, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 137, U.N. Doe A/32/
45 (1977). For more on this aspect of the renewed effort against torture, see infra note 29.
25. Nowak, Recent Developments in Combating Torture, SIM NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1987, at 24,
27. See also Vargas, Adoption of a European Convention against Torture, COUNCIL OF EUROPE
FORUM, Oct. 1987, at 1.
26. See Vargas, supra note 24. The texts of the four Geneva Conventions are available at 75
U.N.T.S. 1, 31, 89, 135, and 287 (1950).
27. Similarly, Amnesty International in 1973 included as one of its recommendations for
strengthening the implementation and protection of individuals against torture the idea that the
press, lawyers, families, and national and international inspectors have access to all prisons and
detention facilities. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CONFERENCE FOR THE ABOLITION OF TOR-
TURE: FINAL REPORT 14 (1973).
28. For a more detailed look at the proposals of these two bodies, see INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS AND SWISS COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, TORTURE: HOW TO MAKE
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION EFFECTIVE (2d ed. 1980).
29. G.A. Res. 32/62 (Dec. 8, 1977) (requesting the UN Commission on Human Rights to
prepare a draft convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment). The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment was adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1984, and
it entered into force on June 26, 1987. G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at,
197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). For a detailed examination of the Convention against Torture's
remedies for torture, see N. RODLEY, supra note 2, at 125; Boulesbaa, An Analysis of the 1984
Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punihment, 4
DICK. J. oF INT'L. L. 185 (1986). The Convention against Torture is not the only UN action
on torture in the 1980's. In 1981, the UN General Assembly established a United Nations
Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. See N. RODLEY, supra note 2, at 133-42; The United
Nations Fund for Torture Victims: The First Years of Activity, ICJ REV., Dec. 1986, at 35; Danelius,
The United Nations Fund for Torture Victims: The First Years of Activity, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 294
(1986). The United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed in 1985 a Special
Rapporteur on Torture to examine torture and report on its occurrence and extent. See N.
RODLEY, supra note 2, at 120-25.
30. See Recommendation 909 (1981) on the International Convention against Torture, Eur. Cons.
Ass., Doc. No. 4650 (1980).
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United Nations Commission decided to delay consideration of the
draft Optional Protocol until after the United Nations Convention
against Torture was established. 31
In 1983, when it was clear, that the proposed United Nations
Convention against Torture would not include the prevention system
envisioned in the draft Optional Protocol, the Council of Europe's
Parliamentary Assembly recommended that the Committee of Minis-
ters adopt the prevention system in a new European convention on
torture. 32 On June 26, 1987, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe adopted* the Convention on the Prevention of Tor-
ture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and opened
it for signature on November 26, 1987. 33 The Convention entered
into force on February 1, 1989, three months after the Council of
Europe received the seventh ratification. 34
The first chapter of the- Convention establishes a European Com-
mittee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Committee) and authorizes it to make visits
to examine "the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty" by the
state in order to strengthen the protection of such individuals from
torture or other ill-treatment. 35 The Convention empowers the Com-
mittee to visit any place within the jurisdiction of the parties in which
the state allegedly deprives individual liberty.36 State authorities must
cooperate with the Committee during such visits. 37
The size of the Committee equals the number of parties to the
Convention. 38 The persons selected to the Committee must be of high
31. Nowak, supra note 25, at 27-28. Nowak notes further that the UN Commission "decided,
in 1986, again to defer consideration of the draft Optional Protocol until its 4th session in the
spring of 1989." Id. at 28.
32. Rec. 971 of Sept. 28, 1983, reprinted in A. REYNAUD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRISONS 191
(1986).
33. Convention, supra note 1.
34. Id., art. 19, para. 1, at 1157. The first seven states to ratify the Convention (with date
of ratification) were Turkey (Feb. 26, 1988), Malta (Mar. 7, 1988), Ireland (Mar. 14, 1988),
Sweden (June 21, 1988), the United Kingdom (June 24, 1988), Luxembourg (Sept. 6, 1988),
and Switzerland (Oct. 7, 1988). Subsequent ratifications have been received from the Netherlands
(Oct. 12, 1988) and France (Jan. 9, 1989). For an overview of the Convention, see Marie, La
Convention europfenne pour la privention de la torture et des peines on traitements inhumains ou dgradants:
un instrument pragmatique a audacieux, 19 REvuE G-N-RALE DE Dnorr 109 (1988); Cassese, A
New Approach to Human Rights: The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, 83 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 128 (1989).
35. Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, at 1154.
36. Id., art. 2, at 1154. Article 2 states: "Each Party shall permit visits, in accordance with
this Convention, to any place within its jurisdiction where persons are deprived of their liberty
by a public authority." Id.
37. Id., art. 3, at 1154. Article 3 states: "In the application of this Convention, the
Committee and the competent national authorities of the Party concerned shall co-operate with
each other." Id.
38. Id., art. 4, para. 1, at 1154.
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moral character and either competent in the human rights field or
have professional experience in penal detention. 39 Only one national
from each state may serve on the Committee, and the Committee
members shall act independently of any state. 40 The national delega-
tions of the parties in the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly
will nominate three individuals for Committee membership. 41 The
Council's Committee of Ministers will then elect the members of the
Committee from the nominated individuals. 42 Subject to a provision
to stagger membership terms, elected members will serve four years
on the Committee. 43 Except where a party refuses to cooperate or act
on Committee recommendations, 44 Committee decisions will be made
by a majority of members present. 45
The Committee may organize visits periodically or when circum-
stances require.4 6 At least two members of the Committee shall make
a visit, assisted by experts and interpreters when the Committee thinks
it necessary. 47 When the Committee decides to make a visit, it must
notify the government of the party of its intention. 48 The text is
ambiguous as to whether the Committee must notify the party of the
specific facilities it intends to visit. Article 8 mentions only the
Committee's general duty to notify the state of an intended visit, but
article 9, paragraph 1 allows the party to "make representations to the
Committee against a visit" to a particular place. 49 The state visited
39. Id., art. 4, para. 2, at 1154.
40. Id., art. 4, paras. 3-4, at 1154.
41. Id., art. 5, para. 1, at 1155.-
42. Id.
43. Id., art. 5, para. 3, at 1155.
44. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
45. Id., art. 6, para. 1, at 1155. A quorum consists of a majority of the members. Id.
46. Id., art. 7, para. 1, at 1155.
47. Id., art. 7, para. 2, at 1155. Article 13 obligates Committee members and the experts,
interpreters, and others selected to assist the Committee to maintain the confidentiality of all
facts and information gathered while carrying out their responsibilities, both during and after
their terms of office. Id., art. 13, at 1156. Experts chosen by the Committee must be knowl-
edgeable and experienced in the fields addressed by the Convention, and such experts are bound
to the same obligations of independence, impartiality, and availability as Committee members.
The Committee must specify the names of the individuals assisting it when serving notice of a
visit governed by article 8. A party may declare that a person chosen to assist the Committee
will nor be allowed to be a part of the visit in its jurisdiction. Id., art. 14, at 1156-57.
Committee members and selected assisting individuals enjoy certain diplomatic privileges and
immunities in exercising their duties, as elaborated in article 16 and the attached Annex. Id.,
arts. 16, annex, at 1157, 1158-59.
48. Id., art. 8, para. 1, at 1155.
49. Id., arts. 8 and 9, para. 1, at 1155-56. According to the International Commission of
Jurists, the intention of the original draft was that "[o]nce having notified a state of their
intention to make a periodic visit, delegates may visit any place of detention without prior
notice, in order to avoid preparatory 'cleaning-up' of particular institutions." The European Draft
Convention Against Torture, ICJ REV., Dec. 1983, at 51-52. The only explicit limitation on the
Committee's visitation rights is article 17, paragraph 3, which states that the Committee will
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must provide Committee delegates unrestricted access to its territory
and to the facilities the Committee wishes to examine, as well as
complete information on such facilities. 50 The Convention secures the
right of the Committee to, interview privately persons deprived of
liberty and to communicate freely with "any person [the Committee]
believes can supply relevant information. '" 51
Once a visit is completed, the Committee has the option of im-
mediately providing the state visited with its findings.' 2 The Com-
mittee will complete a report after each visit.53, The report is not a
legal judgment or interpretation evaluating whether torture or other
ill-treatment actually took place at the facilities visited. Rather, it sets
forth the facts the Committee found during its visit. The Committee
will send the report to the state visited with recommendations if
needed. 54 Further, the Committee may consult with the party on how
best to improve protection of persons deprived of liberty. 51 All dealings
between the party visited and the Committee are confidential. 56 Sub-
ject to this confidentiality requirement, the Committee will provide
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe with a general
report of its activities that will be sent to the Consultative Assembly
and made public. 57
Article 9, however, contains a 'general escape clause' that allows
parties to forestall a visit by making exceptional "representations" to
the Committee that the proposed time and place of the visit conflicts
with national defense, public safety, ongoing prison disorder,, the
medical condition of detainees, or urgent interrogations of a serious
crime. 5 If a party makes such representations, the Convention obliges
not visit places where representatives of protecting powers or the International Committee of
the Red Cross visit on a periodic basis under the terms of the four Geneva Conventions of Aug.
12, 1949 and the two Protocols thereto of June 8, 1977. Convention, supra note 1, art. 17,
para. 3, at 1157. The text of the Geneva Conventions can be found at 75 U.N.T.S. 1, 31, 89,
135 and 287 (1950); the text of the two Protocols is reprinted in 16 1.L.M. 1391, 1442 (1977).
50. Convention, supra note 1, art. 8, para. 2, at 1155.
51. Id., art. 8, para. 4, at 1155.
52. Id., art. 8, para. 5, at 1155.
53. Id., art. 10, para. 1, at 1156.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id., art. 11, para. 1, at 1156. The Committee cannot publish reports of visits or personal
information gathered therein without permission of the state visited or individual interviewed.
Also, the Committee must publish its report when asked by the party to do so. Id., art. 11,
paras. 2-3, at 1156.
57. Id., art. 12, at 1156.
58. Id., art. 9, para. 1, at 1156. The relevant text states:
In exceptional circumstances, the competent authorities of the Party concerned may make
representations to the Committee against a visit at the time or to the particular place
proposed by the Committee. Such representations may only be made on grounds of national
defence, public safety, serious disorder in places where persons are deprived of their liberty,
the medical condition of a person or that an urgent interrogation relating to a serious crime
is in progress.
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it to consult with the Committee to clarify its position and to seek
arrangements that would allow the Committee to undertake the visit
nonetheless. 59 If the Committee wanted to visit a particular individual,
the party must provide the Committee information about that person
until the visit takes place. 60
Should a party refuse either to cooperate with the Committee or to
improve a situation subsequent to Committee recommendations, the
Committee will allow it the opportunity to explain its actions. 6 1 After
such explanation, the Committee by a two-thirds majority may decide
to make a public statement concerning the situation. 62
For most of the member states of the Council of Europe, the impact
of the new Convention will be marginal. Most Western European
states enjoy good records in the treatment of prisoners and detainees. 63
The new Convention may help Europeans clarify and monitor mini-
mum standards for the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty,
but most European states maintain such standards without the need
for a.supranational watchdog body.64
The Convention could have greater impact in the one Council of
Europe member state where torture is still a major problem: Turkey.
According to Amnesty International, nearly all of the 250,000 polit-
ical prisoners interrogated by Turkish police since 1980 were tor-
tured. 65 Although Turkey has joined the new Convention, the Con-
vention's impact on torture in Turkey remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, Turkey's ,record will likely improve--but for reasons
59. Id., art. 9, para. 2, at 1156. The relevant text states:
Following such representations, the Committee and the Party shall immediately enter into
consultations in order to clarify the situation and seek agreement on arrangements to enable
the Committee to exercise its functions expeditiously. Such arrangements may include the
transfer to another place of any person whom the Committee proposed to visit. Until the
visit takes place, the Party shall provide information to the Committee about any person
concerned.
60. Id.
61. Id., art. 10, para. 2, at 1156.
62. Id. It is not clear if the Committee's obligation not to publish confidential information
under article 11 is relaxed when a state refuses to cooperate with the Committee and the
Committee votes to make a public statement on the matter under article 10, para. 2.
63. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ToRTURE IN
THE EIGHTIES (1984).
64. In 1973, the Council of Europe passed a resolution recommending that member states
incorporate Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in their national legislation
and penal policies. Fawcett, Reform of the European Convention on Human Rights, Pun. LAW,
Autumn 1983, at 471. The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners was created
in 1955 by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.
The new Committee for the Prevention of Torture might help monitor these standard rules, but
it has no authority to declare whether standard rules are being violated. For more on the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, see Clifford, The Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners, 66 AM. J. INT'L. L. 232 (1972); N. RODLEY, supra note 2, at 221.
65. Turks Enjoy More Freedom but Torture Continues, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at 2, col. 1.
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unconnected with the Convention. Turkey wants to join the European
Community (EC), 66 and until it makes progress on human rights, its
application for EC membership is unlikely to gain. approval. 67 Any',
improvement in Turkey's torture record, therefore, should not be
credited automatically to the Convention.
Further, if Turkey or any other European state wished to frustrate
the Committee's activities, the text of the Convention provides ample
loopholes. The biggest loophole is the 'general escape clause' contained
in article 9.68 The celebrated cases of torture in Europe during the life
of the European Convention arose under emergency situations 69 or in
relation to terrorist or violent political offenses. 70 The loophole in
article 9 seems designed to give states freedom of action for dealing
with such incidents and emergencies' and will blunt the Convention's
impact on state responses to such situations. Through this provision,
state parties wield considerable discretion over the Committee's right
to make visits, undercutting much of the seemingly mandatory lan-
guage in the Convention. 7
1
Since torture and other ill-treatment rarely occur in most European
states and since the Convention provides states with a generous escape
clause, the Convention does not represent the brave step that its
proponents' rhetoric would indicate. Gautier, responding to criticism
of the Convention, revealed that the major motive for the Convention.
was that the European example would encourage the prevention
scheme to be extended to other regions and international bodies. This
motive suggests that the Convention was intended primarily not to
prevent torture in Europe but rather as an "act of faith" for the fight
against torture in the international system.
72
The hope that the Convention will serve as a model and a catalyst
for other regional and international action against torture ignores
several harsh facts. First, the visitation scheme was available for many
years to the United Nations and the Organization of American States
(OAS) when both organizations were drafting new conventions against
torture. Yet both the United Nations and the OAS adopted conven-
tions that do not include a prevention scheme in any form at all.
73
66. See Turkey Applies to Join The European Community, MIDDLE EAST EXEC. REP., June 1987,
at 20.
67. See Turks Enjoy More Freedom but Torture Continues, supra note 65.
68. Convention, supra note 1, art. 9, para. 1, at 1156.
69. See supra note 6 and the cases contained therein.
70. Cassese, supra note 34, at 133.
71. As one commentator states, "this provision could still be misused with a view to
preventing or at least delaying certain visits." Nowak, supra note 25, at 29.
72. See Vargas, supra note 25, at 2.
73. See the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 29, and the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 30
Further, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has re-
peatedly delayed consideration of the prevention scheme contained in
the Optional Protocol to the 1984 United Nations Convention against
Torture.7 4
Second, the United Nations and other regional international orga-
nizations are not renowned for implementing effective enforcement
remedies-for human rights violations.75 In the unlikely event that a
visitation scheme is adopted on a global level, it will most likely be
watered down considerably from what appears in the new Convention
for Europe.
Third, the high degree of cooperation and interdependence between
European states make it possible for them to adopt a prevention scheme
like the one embodied in the Convention. Such cooperation and in-
terdependence are present in the international community to a much
lesser extent, if at all. To create and implement a prevention system,
community solidarity must be at a threshold level that the interna-
tional and various regional communities currently do not approach.
Fourth, Europe's ability to maintain a solid record on torture and
to adopt a novel human rights convention has less to do with the
power of international human rights law than with the firm convictions
shared by the European democracies of the inviolability of individual
civil and political rights and of the vigorous rule of law. Such convic-
tion, reflecting the influence of Western values, is unfortunately lack-
ing in many other nations, frustrating and eroding the basis for
successful human rights instruments.7 6
In the Convention, European states have challenged the interna-
tional system to close the gap between rhetoric and action in the fight
against torture. The Convention's strategy of preventing torture by
creating an independent supranational body to visit detention and
penal facilities goes to the heart of the problem with human rights:
effective supervision and implementation of human rights standards.
The Europeans' forthrightness, however, should not be confused with
measureable progress against torture in Europe or the international
and Punish Torture, O.A.S. Treaty Series, No. 67, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986). On the
Inter-American Convention, see Nowak, supra note 25, at 30-31.
74. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
75. In the words of one scholar:
Despite the vast proliferation of instruments setting standards on human rights, imposing
obligations as regards the observance of those standards and establishing procedures to deal
with breaches of those obligations, violations of human rights continue, their perpetrators
apparently undeterred.
Cassese, supra note 34, at 128.
76. "Until national legal systems improve their performance it is naive to put faith in 'progress
by international legislation.'" Brownlie, The Expansion of International Society: The Consequencee for
the Law of Nations, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SocIET 357, 368 (H. Bull & A.
Watson eds. 1984).
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system. For the foreseeable future, the Convention will stand for the
obvious proposition that prohibiting torture requires better enforce-
ment of human rights norms. It becomes, ironically, another admirable
human rights objective against which stand all the harsh realities of
domestic and international politics. For Europe and the international
system, then, the new Convention is more symbol than substance.
David Fidler
